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Commentary
THE SERENDIPITOUS SOLUTION TO
THE PROBLEM OF SUPREME COURT
APPOINTMENTS©
PETER MCCORMICK*
1 there can be no
Judges matter. In the age of the Charter,
question about this 2-the role of courts and judges has expanded to
include a wider range of legal and policy issues, invoked by a wider
universe of groups and individuals, than anyone would have imagined
possible even a few decades ago. There was a time when most political
science textbooks did not include a chapter on the courts; today, such an
omission would be unthinkable. We are all court-watchers now.
The logical corollary is that who the judge is also matters: when
a vacancy must be filled, especially on the Supreme Court of Canada, it
makes a difference whether it is filled by person X or person Y. Some
find this observation unpalatable-others would even suggest it is
insulting to the judges-but every time the Supreme Court hands down
a 5-4 decision, it makes the argument for me.3 And there have been
some very important 5-4 decisions recently: Doucet-Boudreau4 on
judicial remedies for Charter violations, Amselenf on freedom of
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Professor of Political Science, University of Lethbridge.
Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
2 In Canada, this is the obvious explanation, but extensive judicial policy engagement is a
global phenomenon and has been treated by some as an attribute of the modern administrative
state, encouraged by, but not necessarily requiring, a formal entrenchment of rights. John Ferejohn,
"Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law" (2002) 65 Law & Contemp. Probs. 41.
' See David M. Levitan, "The Effect of the Appointment of a Supreme Court Justice"
(1996) 28 U. Tol. L. Rev. 37.
4

Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister ofEducation),[2003] 3 S.C.R. 3.

5

Syndicat Northcrestv. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551.
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religion, not to mention the 3-3-1 confusion of Chaoulli6 on the
constitutionality of certain aspects of the medicare system. As the
doctrine of stare decisis softens-as the Court is more willing to change
its mind from what it has decided just recently, sometimes subtly and
sometimes substantially-these divisions mean that individual judges'
votes matter.
Traditionally, we have shrugged off such concerns with two
arguments. The first argument suggests that the identity of specific
judges does not matter because there is always a single correct answer to
any legal question, and judges are trained professionals who know the
objective and logical processes that take them to that correct answer; it
is only outsiders (like social scientists) who think there is an element of
choice such that individuals make a difference. But formalism (the
interpretive doctrine that made this plausible) has been replaced by the
open-endedness of "contextualism" (the Court's own label7 ) and of
"purposive interpretation." 8 This is not to say that there are no
constraints, not to suggest that judges are, as Weiler once put it, "just
making it up as they go along," 9 but simply to say that there is not
infrequently a zone of discretion within which judges can legitimately
choose between more than one not-incorrect answer. ° In Lawrence
Solum's terminology, judicial decisions are neither determined nor
undetermined, but under-determined." At any rate, the "only one
correct answer" assertion was always undermined by the phenomena of
judicial dissent and separate concurrence: if there is always a single
correct answer, why are so many judges so often unable to agree on
what it is?
The second argument is that the problem can be finessed simply
by filling any vacancy with the single very best candidate available. The
problem, appointment announcement encomiums notwithstanding, is

6 Chaoulliv. Ouebec (Attorney General),[2005] 1 S.C.R. 791.

'See e.g. Manulife Bank of Canada v. Conlin, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 415.
'See e.g. Aharon Barak, PurposiveInterpretationin Law(Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2005).
' Paul Weiler, In the Last Resort. A Critical Study of the Supreme Court of Canada
(Toronto: Carswell, 1974).
0

See Aharon Barak, JudicialDiscretion(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).
" Lawrence B. Solum, "On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma" (1987) 54
U. Chicago L. Rev. 462.
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that we have no transparently objective way of determining which
candidate is truly "the best." We can separate the good candidates from
the poor ones, and perhaps even distinguish the very good ones from the
(merely) good ones, but not much more. In the American literature,
Gulati and Choi provoked a long-running debate by suggesting they had
developed a neutral mechanism for generating a "score" identifying the
candidate from the lower courts who best deserved elevation to the
circuit courts of appeal or the U.S. Supreme Court itself.' Simply to
describe the project invites skepticism: even assuming agreement on all
the items to be measured (doubtful in itself), how do we translate them
into inter-commensurable numbers, and then how do we decide how to
weight them against each other?
But this just brings us back to the initial problem: even once we
have limited the pool to "very good" candidates, selecting the "best" will
still involve some assessment of the congruence between the values and
priorities of the candidate and those of the evaluator. The long-standing
practice of patronage, now in public disfavour, was a crude mechanism
for accomplishing this. Today, a more nuanced and effective assessment
is possible, especially when candidates already serve on lower courts, 3
because judges value consistency so much that yesterday's decisions are
a good indicator of tomorrow's.1 4 Indeed, we would think less of the
appointment process if it did not consider these factors. From time to
time, otherwise commendable judges deliver decisions that diverge from
those of their fellow judges and from the mainstream of informed
opinion-an appointing authority should certainly take this into
account. Other things being equal, those who appoint judges will try to
create a court reflecting their own values and priorities. Because of this
tendency, most countries have created judicial appointment procedures

The initial paper was entitled "A Tournament of Judges" (2004) 92 Cal. L. Rev. 299; the
follow-up pieces culminated in "Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking the Statistics" in 2005 NYU
Annual Survey of Law. Both papers are downloadable from the Social Science Research Network
site, online: <http://www.ssrn.com >. The FloridaState University Law Review devoted a special
issue to this debate in (2005) 32:4 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
'1See especially Nancy Scherer, Scoring Points: Politicians,Activists and the Lower Court
Appointment Process(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).

" See Reed C. Lawlor, "Personal Stare Decisi' (1967) 73 S. Calif. L. Rev. 41.
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(especially for their national high
courts) that require co-operation
5
between different sets of actors.'
Canada is the great exception. Peter Russell has described us as
"the only constitutional democracy in the world in which the leader of
government has an unfettered discretion to decide who will sit on the
country's highest court."' 6 When Paul Martin included the Court
appointment process as part of the "democratic deficit" he wanted to
tackle as prime minister, it required only his fiat (nothing as messy as
legislative approval, let alone constitutional amendment) to adopt a new
process in 2004 with Irwin Cotler, the minister of justice, defending
appointees before an ad hoc legislative committee. It was equally easy in
2005 for Martin to substitute a new system (a council of judges, lawyers,
and politicians to narrow a shortlist of eight to a shorter list of three),
and as easy again for Stephen Harper in 2006 to add an appearance by
the nominee before another ad hoc parliamentary committee. Not only
the final decision but all the bells and whistles leading up to it are in the
complete control of the prime minister, who is as constrained as he
wants to be (but no more).
To be sure, we have sometimes noticed the problem. During the
constitutional reform debates of the 1970s and 1980s, the most obvious
problem with the unilateral appointment process was federalism: if the
Supreme Court is to serve as a referee of federalism, then it is
anomalous that "Team Federal" brings the referee and "Team
Provincial" has to hope for the best. If federalism is the problem, then
the provincial premiers are the solution, in the sense of deserving some
meaningful role to balance that of the prime minister. Had the Meech
Lake Accord been approved, prime ministers would choose Supreme
Court justices from shortlists submitted by premiers. Although the
parallel provision for senators gave us a number of new senators before
the Accord died, no judges were appointed in this way. But today,
federalism and the federal/provincial division of powers no longer

' See, for example, the excellent collection by Kate Malleson & Peter Russell, eds.,
Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power. Critical Perspectives from Around the World
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006).
6 Canada, The Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness, Improving the Supreme Court of Canada Approitments Prcoess
(Ottawa: The Standing- Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness, 2004) (Chair: Derek Lee), online: <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/committeepublication
.aspx?com =8795&lang= l&sourceid =84157>.
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centre the debate about judicial power; in Canada, as in other countries,
the "rights stuff' that used to be secondary and derivative has taken
pride of place.17 When the House of Commons Justice Committee held
public hearings on the appointment process in the spring of 2004, only
two of a parade of expert witnesses (both political scientists) even
mentioned the federalism issue and its practical corollary, a significant
role for provincial premiers.
Suddenly faced with two unexpected Supreme Court vacancies
in the summer of 2004, the government offered a minor adjustment to
the appointment process: once former prime minister Martin had
selected nominees through the usual procedures, their names would be
presented to an ad hoc committee of legislators. However, the
committee would not be permitted to question either the nominees or
the prime minister who had selected them; under this scheme, it would
be the minister of justice's function to answer questions about the
nominees' credentials. Further, the committee would not have any
power of veto or even delay. This caricature of an American-style
"advise and consent" confirmation was, as one journalist quipped, the
equivalent of sending your mother to do your job interview. But the real
problem was less that the reform did not go far enough than that it was
headed in the wrong direction. Even without the current American
deadlock on judicial appointments to warn us off, the problem is that
the process risks becoming either an important but essentially empty
symbolic rubber stamp or an occasion for conflict between the
nominator and the ratifier with the nominees caught in the cross-fire.
Eighteen months later, anticipating another Court vacancy, the
Martin government came up with a new procedure. The minister of
justice would submit eight names to an ad hoc committee including
judges, lawyers, and politicians, whose private deliberations would
reduce the list to three names from which the prime minister would
select. This new procedure was annoyingly nervous about the
committee, which was constrained in a variety of ways, all of which
enhanced the role of the minister of justice. However, the more basic
problem was that the initial set of eight names was proposed by one
member of a federal cabinet, to be reduced to three names for final

lZ Martin Shapiro, "The Success of Judicial Review" in Sally J. Kenney, William M.
Reisinger & John C. Reitz, eds., ConstitutionalDialoguesin ComparativePerspective (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1999).
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selection by another member of the same cabinet. By no stretch of the
imagination was this a process insulated from direct political (even
partisan) considerations. From a caricature of an American-style
confirmation process, we have "progressed" to a caricature of an
independent judicial nominating committee. 8 At least we were, in my
opinion, finally looking at the right end of the process-a neutral way of
coming up with an initial shortlist is a more effective way of containing
partisan influences than a last-minute stand-or-fall ratification.
But a funny thing happened on the way to the 2006 Court
appointment: a federal general election intervened and a new
government took office. The new process was already well under way;
eight names had been submitted to the committee, the deliberations had
taken place, and a shortlist of three names had emerged. To defuse
controversy, Prime Minister Harper announced that he would make his
selection from the existing shortlist, simply adding an appearance by the
nominee before the same sort of ad hoc legislative committee that we
had seen in 2004 (with a retired constitutional law professor to run
interference on potentially inappropriate questions).
But in fact, the continuity was an illusion, and the accident of an
intervening election completely changed the appointment procedure in
a positive and promising way. Before the election, the minister of justice
(a Liberal) submitted eight names to a committee, which duly
deliberated to reduce the list to three; after the election, the prime
minister (a Conservative) selected one of the three names. Instead of a
process bracketed by officials within a single political party, the
committee became a bridge between government and opposition,
resulting in a professionally qualified candidate acceptable to both of
them.
We got here by accident, but we should take this happy chance
and run with it. Instead of the minister of justice providing the initial
names, the opposition parties should do so: say, four names provided by
the official opposition and two names from any other party enjoying
official party status within the Commons. They could draw on the
existing information-gathering processes of the Department of Justice to
guide their choice. The fact that more than one party submits names
creates a competitive incentive for the opposition parties to come up
", For a more extended discussion, see Peter McCormick, "$electing the Supremes: Judicial
Appointment in Canada" (2005) 7 J. App. Pr. & Pro. 1.
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with strong candidates who will survive committee scrutiny and be
acceptable to the prime minister. The prime minister retains the final
choice, but his discretion is tightly contained. There is a need for some
additional tweaking of the current rules-for example, too many of the
members of the committee are described simply as "a person chosen by"
a minister; it is open to question whether the prime minister should have
the option of simply rejecting the final list; and one day the procedure
should be appropriately entrenched rather than depend on
governmental self-restraint. Essentially, however, we are looking at a
modest and easy operational change in an already existing procedure, all
the more delightful because it emerged by accident.
For some, the reason for changing the appointment process is a
desire to constrain the creative imagination of the Court, at least to the
extent that it is directed by the agenda of a particular political party or
party leader. But every coin has an obverse, and under this scheme the
Court would no longer be vulnerable to attack as the prime minister's
personal toy or Ottawa's lapdog, criticisms that have been hard to reject
in the past because they had a kernel of truth. A more neutral
appointment process would cover the Court's weak flank by pre-empting
such criticism. Potentially, the big winner from these changes will be the
Court itself.
Justice Rothstein is the first member of the Court to be chosen
through a healthy and positive interaction between the government and
opposition. He must not be the last.

